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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JUAN CARLOS COLIN,

:

Petitioner/Appellee,
v.

:
:
Case No. 20070211-CA

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals the granting of a petition for post-conviction relief, which
challenged petitioner Colin's guilty plea to one count of attempted forcible sexual abuse.
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue: Did the post-conviction court err by granting a petition for post-conviction
relief at a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss, without giving the State the
opportunity to respond to the merits of the petition?
Standard of Review: "Generally, an appeal from a judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief raises questions of law reviewed for correctness, giving no
deference to the post-conviction court's conclusion." Wickham v. Galetka, 2002 UT 72,
^[7, 61 P.3d 978 (citation omitted). An appellate court "determine[s] as a matter of law
-2-

whether procedural error occurred." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App.
1992). A trial court's procedural error may constitute grounds for reversing its order.
Gillmor v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205, 1208 (Utah App. 1991); and Peterson v. The
Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, p o , 48 P.3d 918.
Preservation: In the post-conviction action below, the State objected to the court
granting the petition following argument on the motion to dismiss, without giving the
State the opportunity to answer or otherwise respond on the merits (R98:16). The State
appeals from the the court's order granting the petition for post-conviction relief
(Addendum A).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules relate to this appeal:
•

Post-Conviction Remedies Act - Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 through § 7835a-110 (West 2004). The text is contained in Addendum B.

•

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C - the text is contained in Addendum C.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Colin was charged with one count of forcible sexual abuse, a second

degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (Information).1 Colin pled
guilty to an amended count of attempted forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony
(Statement of Defendant). On April 11, 1997, Colin was sentenced to 0 to 5 years in the

1

The trial court record has not been paginated because Colin did not file a direct appeal.
Therefore, when referring to the trial court record in the underlying criminal case
#971900070, the State will simply name the document.
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Utah State prison (Judgment, Sentence). The prison sentence was suspended and Colin
was granted probation for 36 months upon compliance with certain conditions
(Conditions of probation).
Colin did not file a timely motion to withdraw his plea and did not file any direct
appeal. On June 12, 2006, Colin filed a motion under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-402, for
reduction in sentence. Following a hearing, the motion was denied (addendum D).2
On November 13, 2006, nine (9) years after Colin pled guilty and was sentenced,
he filed an untimely memorandum in support of motion to vacate judgement and
withdraw plea (Rl-24). 3

On December 18, 2006, Third District Court Judge Deno

Himonas entered a ruling which stated that the motion was in substance a petition for
post-conviction relief.

Therefore, the motion was filed as a civil petition for post-

conviction relief, as case no. 060920152.4
On December 18, 2006, the post-conviction court entered an order which directed
the State to file a response on or before December 27, 2006 (R25-26). However, the
court did not provide a copy of the petition as required by rule 65C(h), Utah Rule of Civil

2

The section 76-3-402 motion and the court's ruling do not appear in the criminal file.
However they are noted on the court docket. A copy of the docket in case # 971900070 is
attached as Addendum D).
3

The record in the post-conviction case, which is the matter on appeal, will be referred to
as (R page number).

4

This ruling also does not appear in the record of the criminal case or the post-conviction
case. However, it appears in the court docket of the criminal case #971900070
(Addendum D).
-4-

procedure. Id. Without a copy of the petition, the State was unable to respond, or even
determine what case petitioner Colin was challenging. And without knowing what case
Colin was challenging, the State could not request a copy of the underlying criminal case.
Therefore, on December 21, 2006, the State requested a copy of the petition and filed a
motion for enlargement of time to respond to the petition within 30 days after receipt of
the petition (R27-29).
The next day, the State received from the court a faxed copy of the petition and an
order requiring respondent to file a response no later than December 31, 2006, thereby
granting the State four (4) additional days to respond to the petition (R30).5
Upon receiving the court's new order and a copy of the petition, counsel for the
State filed a motion requesting release of the record in the underlying criminal case
(Motion for release of record and transcripts). However, the record was not released until
after the State filed its motion to dismiss.
The State filed a motion to dismiss and a supporting memorandum (R33-46).
Since the underlying criminal case had not yet been received, the motion to dismiss could
not state the facts of the criminal case, and could not respond in full to the merits of the
issues raised in the petition. The State argued that the petition should be denied and
dismissed with prejudice because, having been filed nine years after the conviction

5

Counsel for the State was out of the office on vacation from December 22 - 26, 2006.
Counsel therefore did not receive the Court's new order and a copy of the petition until
return to the office on December 27, 2006.
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became final, it was untimely (R33-46). Colin filed a reply to the State's motion to
dismiss (R53-72).6
On February 27, 2007, the post-conviction court heard argument on the State's
motion to dismiss (R98:l-18).7 The hearing was specifically docketed as argument on the
motion to dismiss and the parties received notice stating that the hearing was on the
motion to dismiss (R79-81). Petitioner Colin appeared pro se by telephone to argue
against the State's motion to dismiss (R83 & 86).
At the conclusion of argument on the motion to dismiss, the post-conviction court
ruled that the petition was timely and that even if it wasn't timely, it met the interest of
justice exception (R98:13 & R103). It therefore denied the State's motion to dismiss
(R103).8
The post-conviction court then granted the petition for post-conviction relief and
vacated Colin's guilty plea (R98:14 & R104). The State objected to the Court's ruling on
the petition, since all the State had the opportunity to do thus far was file the motion to
dismiss (R98:16). The State had not filed any written response on the merits of the

6

Colin erroneously served his reply on the District Attorney instead of the Attorney
General (R70).

7

A copy of the transcript of the hearing on the State's motion to dismiss is included as
Addendum E.
8

The State is not appealing denial of the motion to dismiss as to the issue concerning
immigration consequences. The post-conviction court entered no ruling as to whether
Colin's claim concerning compliance with Rule 11 was timely (R98:16, R103). It
remains the State's position that this claim is time barred.
-6-

claims. The State asked for an evidentiary hearing on the merits (R98:16). The State's
request was denied (R98:16-17).
The post-conviction court's final order granting the petition was filed on April 2,
2007 (R105) (Addendum A). The State timely appealed (R90).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS9
"Murray police have spoken with Sofia Dissel, DOB 09/15/80, who states that on
November 22, 1996 she was walking down State Street and 6400 South when a man
approached her and asked her if she wanted a ride. She accepted. On the way to R.C.
Willey at 800 East and 6400 South, the man touched Sofia's belly, thighs and vagina.
Sofia pulled the man's hand out of her pants. The man then touched her stomach and
breasts skin-to-skin. The man also took Sofia's hand and placed it in his crotch area
outside his clothing. The man dropped Sofia off at Eat-A-Burger on 7200 South and 800
East. Sofia wrote down the man's license plate number and has positively identified
defendant Juan Carlos Colin as the man who groped her."
FACTS FROM ORAL ARGUMENT ON THE MOTION TO DISMISS
Oral argument on the State's motion to dismiss was held on February 27, 2007
(R98). At the beginning of the hearing, counsel for the State said: "Well, essentially,
your Honor, he [Colin] filed a petition and we haven't responded on the merits, we
simply filed a motion to dismiss." (R98:2). The Court responded by saying "Right." Id.
9

Since Colin pled guilty, no trial was held. Therefore the statement of the facts is
quoted from the probable cause statement attached to the Information in the court file
of the underlying criminal case # 971900070. It is double spaced for ease in reading.
-7-

Petitioner Colin appeared pro se by telephone, representing himself to argue
against the State's motion to dismiss (R83 & 85). Colin was not placed under oath.10 (See
R98).
The court told petitioner Colin that its biggest concern was that it seemed that there
was a conflicting statement. "[0]ne was that no one had said anything to you about the
immigration consequences of your plea." (R98:3). To which Colin said: "Right." Id.
The Court went on to say, "[a]nd then at one point in your petition, you actually asserted
affirmatively that - - that - - that you were told, as I recall." (R98:3). The Court then
asked counsel for the State to clarify.
Counsel for the State said that in his petition, Colin "said several different things.
He said they failed to adequately advise him, that he was misled, that they neglected to
adequately inform him and that he was misinformed as to the immigration consequences.
So he's kind of, it seems to me, either making two statements or else not clarifying."
(R98:3). Counsel also reminded the Court that in his written and signed declaration
attached to the petition, Colin specifically stated that "his counsel never discussed with
him the possible immigration consequences." (R98:3-4, Addendum F).
Counsel for the State said, "I think we need to clarify that, whether they never
discussed it with him, which he's considering failing to adequately advise him, or if he's
10

The State did not request that Colin be placed under oath, because this was not an
evidentiary hearing. This was oral argument on a motion to dismiss, and Colin was
entitled to argue without being placed under oath, because he was acting pro se.
-8-

alleging that they actively misled him and if so, what he's claiming they said to him."
(R98:4).
The Court then said to Mr. Colin, 'That's what I would like to hear from you."
(R98:4). Mr. Colin's response was confusing and practically unintelligible.
Okay. They - - they told me - - they - - they - - my counsel, he - - he
told me I would not get deported, okay? The other thing he, when I
(inaudible) the immigration consequences about, you know, because this, I
knew it had to be innocent, meanwhile, he never told me that. He told me I
no longer get deported, (inaudible) he handle it, he know - - he says he
know - - 1 know - - immigrant (inaudible) he told me, you know, not going
to have any problems, you know, I - -1 don't want to get deported, because
he never - - I wanted to make sure that (inaudible) the consequences about
the future when I try to be a citizen, you know, or in case they take my - my - - my papers away and I can deported for life, you know, he didn't tell
me that.
When - - when he - - when I - - I say (inaudible) he told me, you
know, there's not going to be any problem, okay, I go back - - go back to
my normal life, you know, I don't want to get deported, okay, understand
that, I - - 1 - - the issue about the immigration consequences about in - - in
the future, (inaudible) to be a citizen, I (inaudible) know its going to affect
me, you know, I'd just as soon go to trial, you know, because why you
going to try and (inaudible) when I do not try to rape somebody, I try to
have a - - a normal life, when in the future, you know, I'm going to become
a (inaudible) citizen, you know, my home, my family are here, my kids and
my wife, you know.
(R98:4-5).
The Court asked Colin when his counsel told him he wasn't going to be deported.
"Did he tell you that before you made your plea or after?"

(R98:5). Again, Colin's

response was difficult to understand. "When, you know, because at - - at one point, the
agreement on it, you know, when he tried to tell me, he explained to me the trial
proceedings, you know. He say, you know, if you go to trial, it's going to be hard and
-9-

maybe you're going to lose, he no tell me exactly what - - you know, what the trial is, you
know." (R98:5).
The Court tried again, and the following exchange took place:
THE COURT:

Mr. Colin, tell me when the lawyer told you you would not be
deported. Did he tell you that before you - -

MR. COLIN:

Before I say, you know, before - - before and after, you know, he say -

THE COURT:

Both before and after?

MR. COLIN:

Un huh.

THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. COLIN:

He say, before he say, take this, it is a good deal, it's not going to be
affected with your nationality, it will not be affected (inaudible) and
you know, you go back to - - it's a good deal, you know.

THE COURT:

All right.

MR. COLIN:

You do it, you do it, (inaudible) good thing I do not sign a paper,
you're going to get deported, you know, why is - - you know, I - -

THE COURT:

Okay, I think we got it.

(R98:6).
Counsel for the State argued that it is not a meritorious claim if counsel did not
advise him of immigration consequences, because counsel is not required to give advice on
collateral consequences (R98:8-9).
Counsel also argued that if the motion to dismiss were denied, then an evidentiary
hearing would be necessary to hear testimony from Mr. Quinlan, petitioner's trial counsel
(R98:9). Counsel then made the following proffer:
-10-

There's nothing from Mr. Quinlan in the file yet. All we have is
statements from Mr. Colin (inaudible) but I could make a proffer for the
Court that I have spoken to Mr. Quinlan and that he advised me that he does
not remember this case specifically, since it's ten years ago, but that it is not
his normal practice and that in fact, he could never recall ever telling
anyone charged with a felony that they would not be deportable.
So, if the Court denies the motion to dismiss and allows the petition to
proceed, I think we need an evidentiary hearing to put on testimony from his
trial counsel, Mr. Quinlan, about that issue, as well as statements from Mr.
(inaudible).
(R98:9) (addendum E) (emphasis added).
At the conclusion of argument on the motion to dismiss, the post-conviction court
ruled that the petition was timely and that even if it wasn't timely, it met the interests of
justice exception (R98:13 & R103). The post-conviction court then granted the petition for
post-conviction relief and vacated Colin's guilty plea (R98:14 & R104).
The Court stated that giving the State's proffer "the maximum force that I think it
could be given, I still don't think it would go to extent [sic] of contradicting what I hear
over the phone, as Mr. Colin's specific recollection of - - of the event and his specific
recollection of the event is that he was told he would not be deported and he based his plea
on that advice and he would not have pled otherwise, if - - if he - - or he would not have
pled guilty if he had been instructed that there might be immigration consequences, which
could lead to his de - deport - - deportation." (R98:14).
The State objected to the Court ruling on the petition, since all the State had the
opportunity to do thus far was file the motion to dismiss (R98:16). The State had not filed

-11-

any written response on the merits of the claims.11 The State asked for an evidentiary
hearing on the merits (R98:16). The State's request was denied (R98:16-17).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
It was reversible error for the post-conviction court to grant a petition for postconviction relief at a hearing on a motion to dismiss, without giving the State the
opportunity to respond on the merits. Since only the petition and a motion to dismiss had
been filed, the only appropriate order was a ruling on the motion to dismiss. A postconviction court is not authorized to grant a post-conviction petition without giving the
State the opportunity to respond on the merits or present relevant evidence on a disputed
issue of fact.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AT A HEARING ON A
MOTION TO DISMISS
A.

The post-conviction court erred by granting the petition without
giving the State the opportunity to respond on the merits.

Oral argument was held on the State's motion to dismiss (R98). At the conclusion
of argument on the motion to dismiss, the court granted the post-conviction petition on the
merits (R98:14). The State had not yet filed any answer to the petition. It had only filed a
motion to dismiss.
11

The State also had not cross-examined Colin, because this was oral argument on the
motion to dismiss, not an evidentiary hearing. The only question counsel for the State
asked Colin, was whether he was alleging that co-counsel Mr. Johnson ever told him he
wouldn't be deported, or if his allegations referred only to Mr. Quinlan (R98:11-12).
-12-

It is error for a court to grant a plaintiff relief on the merits at a hearing on a motion
to dismiss. The Utah Supreme Court has said, "[w]e know of no way in which a trial court
can shortcut orderly procedure and change a motion to dismiss into a hearing on the merits.
. . . Unless appellant had in some way waived his right to a hearing or had refused to further
plead after the motion had been disposed of, he would be entitled to file an answer and be
heard on the merits." Behm's Estate v. Gee, 213 P.2d 664, 666 (Utah 1950). Here, the
State did not waive its right to a hearing, but objected to the Court granting the petition
without giving it the opportunity to respond on the merits (R98:16). The State was entitled
to file an answer and be heard on the merits.
In Behrn, the Utah Supreme Court said that since the matter was pending on a
motion to dismiss, it viewed the judgment as having been prematurely made. "Under the
existing state of the pleadings the only appropriate order that could have been entered was
one denying the motion to dismiss and granting appellant a reasonable time to answer."
Behm, 213 P.2d at 666. The same is true in the case at issue. The only appropriate order
was a ruling on the motion to dismiss. Since the motion to dismiss was denied, the postconviction court should have granted the State a reasonable time to answer and be heard on
the merits.
B.

The post-conviction court erred by turning the hearing on the
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, without
giving the State notice or an opportunity to present evidence.

By considering the statements made by petitioner over the telephone as evidence, the
court essentially turned the State's motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment
-13-

by the petitioner. However, the State was not given proper notice or an opportunity to
present its evidence. "[I]f a motion to dismiss is converted to a motion for summary
judgment, it must only be done so as to not create procedural prejudice to one of the
parties." Colman v. Utah State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1990).
Numerous Utah courts have held that "[i]t is error to consider a motion to dismiss as
a motion for summary judgment, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present
pertinent material." Strand v. Assoc. Students of the Univ. of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193
(Utah 1977) (citation omitted); see also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Assoc, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978) (the record must clearly demonstrate that when a
motion to dismiss is made and matters outside the pleading are presented, all parties are
given reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if they wish); Alvarez
v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 987, 990, n.6 (Utah 1997) (court did not treat the motion as one for
summary judgment, but even if it had, Alvarez was not given notice or reasonable
opportunity to respond).
If a court decides to consider materials outside the pleadings, "all parties must be
given adequate notice and opportunity to submit supporting materials, particularly the party
against whom summary judgment is entered." Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (citation omitted).
"The action of the trial court in denying the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity to present
controverting material violated the mandate of the rule." Id.

-14-

C.

The post-conviction court erred by making its decision based on a
proffer, without allowing the State to present witnesses or
evidence.

During the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the State made a proffer
that petitioner's trial counsel told her that "he does not remember this case specifically,
since it's ten years ago, but that it is not his normal practice and that in fact, he could never
recall ever telling anyone charged with a felony that they would not be deportable."
(R98:9).
This proffer demonstrated that a genuine issue of material fact existed. Thus, if the
motion to dismiss were to be denied, an evidentiary hearing would be necessary. A proffer
is simply "a mechanism by which a party may create an appellate record of what the
evidence would have shown." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^[36, 25 P.3d 985. However, the
Court entered its ruling based on the proffer and statements made over the telephone by the
petitioner. It refused to give the State the opportunity to respond on the merits and present
its evidence.
It was error for the Court to proceed based on this proffer, without allowing the State
to respond on the merits and present its evidence. Parties may consent to a court's reliance
on proffers, and may submit an issue for ruling based on proffers. Odak v. Odak, 1998 WL
1758373 (Utah App.1998) (unpublished memo, decision) (copy attached as Addendum G).
However, that did not occur here. In this case, counsel specifically objected to the court
entering a ruling on the petition without giving the State an opportunity to present evidence
and respond on the merits (R98:16). Counsel for the State said: "[i]f the Court's going to
-15-

rule on the actual petition, we would ask for an evidentiary hearing to bring Mr. Quinlan in
to testify so that his testimony is on the record for appeal." (R98:16).
The Court stated that it had given the State the maximum benefit of its proffer
(R98:16).

However, where the record is unclear about what counsel did because of

inability to recall due to the passage of time, the presumption that counsel did what should
have been done and exercised reasonable judgment prevails. Sallahdin v. Muffin, 380 F.3d
1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2004); Williams v. Head, 185 F.3d 1223, 1227-28 (11th Cir. 1999).
In addition, the State had not presented any testimony or evidence (because this was
not an evidentiary hearing, it was argument on the motion to dismiss). Counsel for the
State also pointed out that petitioner's trial counsel had not yet had a chance to go back and
look at the file to see if there might be notes or additional information in the file, relevant to
this issue (R98:16).
The file might not contain any helpful information.

However, it could contain

information concerning what, if anything, Colin told his counsel about his immigration
status, and what, if anything, counsel said to Colin about possible immigration
consequences.

"The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or

substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions." Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). However, there has been no evidence presented as
to what, if anything, petitioner told his trial counsel about his nationality, citizenship,
residence, or immigrant status.
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D.

The post-conviction court erred by failing to consider whether
petitioner had met the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard.

In a petition for post-conviction relief, "[t]he petitioner has the burden of pleading
and proving by a preponderance of the evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner
to relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105. Petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of
counsel. Under Strickland, when asserting a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner must establish not only that his counsel's performance was deficient, but also that
he was prejudiced. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. "[T]he two-part Strickland v. Washington
test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel." Hill v.
Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58, 106 S.Ct. 366 (1985).
Assuming, solely for purposes of this argument, that counsel's performance was
deficient because he told Colin that his guilty plea would not cause him to be deportable,
that does not establish prejudice. "[I]n order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement, the
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill, 474 U.S. at
59; see also Moench v. State, 2004 UT App 57, %L\\ 88 P.3d 353; Parsons v. Barnes, 871
P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994); and Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Hill, 474U.S. at 59). "[C]ourts applying this standard will often review the
strength of the prosecutor's case as the best evidence of whether a defendant in fact would
have changed his plea and insisted on going to trial." Miller, 262 F.3d at 1072.
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"It is not necessary for the defendant to show that he actually would have prevailed
at trial, although the strength of the government's case against the defendant should be
considered in evaluating whether the defendant really would have gone to trial if he had
received adequate advice from his counsel." Miller, 262 F.3d at 1069.
Therefore, a petitioner's assertion that he would not have pled guilty is not sufficient
to establish prejudice. "[M]ere allegation that he would have insisted on trial but for his
trial counsel's errors, although necessary, is ultimately insufficient to entitle him to relief.
Rather, we look to the factual circumstances surrounding the plea to determine whether
[he] would have proceeded to trial." United States v. Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183, 1186 (10th
Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
Actual prejudice is weighed against the totality of evidence before the trier of fact.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695. The determination as to a whether petitioner has met the
prejudice prong must include consideration of all of the facts and circumstances of the case.
This includes information such as whether the petitioner had confessed, or given a
statement to the police, the strength of the State's case, whether the plea offer was to a
reduced charge, and the likelihood of conviction on the greater charge if petitioner had
gone to trial. None of this information was considered in the post-conviction case.
Petitioner was originally charged with forcible sexual abuse, a second degree felony.
He pled guilty to a reduced charge of attempted forcible sexual abuse, a third degree felony.
Even if counsel had advised petitioner that he would be deportable if he pled guilty to the
reduced charge, counsel might still have advised petitioner to plead guilty, because he
-18-

would also have been deportable if convicted of the more serious offense. See e.g. State v.
Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 19, 26 P.3d 203 ("there's no doubt... that [defendant] got a better
deal than he would have gotten . . . if he were tried. Had counsel known the first degree
conviction could not be reduced, he would not have advised defendant any differently. He
still would have advised defendant to plead guilty.") (additional quotation omitted).
E.

The post-conviction court erred by granting the petition without
evaluating the credibility of witnesses.

When there are contradictory statements of fact, one of the duties of a district court
Judge is to determine the credibility of the witnesses. "It is for the factfinder to determine
witness credibility." State v. Stefaniak, 900 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Utah App. 1995). "When the
evidence presented is conflicting or disputed, the jury [or the factfinder] serves as the
exclusive judge of both the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given particular
evidence." State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). "The
United States Supreme Court has clearly held that the right to confront witnesses at trial
and to provide the factfinder an opportunity to assess their credibility cannot be lightly
dismissed." State v. Chapman, 655 P.2d 1119, 1122 (Utah 1982).
The post-conviction court was not able to assess the credibility of any State
witnesses, because it refused to allow the State to present testimony from witnesses. The
State made a proffer that trial counsel had stated that "he does not remember this case
specifically, since it's ten years ago, but that it is not his normal practice and that in fact, he
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could never recall ever telling anyone charged with a felony that they would not be
deportable." (R98:9).
As addressed above, the court should not have proceeded based solely on a proffer
and petitioner's confusing, unsworn statement over the telephone. The court should have
considered the credibility of witnesses. A court cannot determine a witness's credibility
based solely on a proffer made by someone else. It appears that the post-conviction court
gave no thought to the issue of credibility. The court simply stated that giving the proffer
the maximum force, "I still don't think it would go to [the] extent of contradicting what I
hear over the phone as Mr. Colin's specific recollection." (R98:14).
In other words, the court was apparently saying that Mr. Quinlan's statement that
"he could never recall ever telling anyone charged with a felony that they would not be
deportable" was not sufficient to contradict Mr. Colin's self-serving statement that his
counsel had improperly advised him of immigration consequences.
But the Court also failed to evaluate the petitioner's credibility. The court relied
uncritically on the unsworn statement of the petitioner, which was made over the telephone,
was difficult to decipher, was not subject to cross examination, and contradicted his
previous signed declaration that his counsel had never discussed possible immigration
consequences with him.
As addressed above, the court should also have considered relevant facts and
circumstances surrounding the criminal case, in determining the credibility of petitioner's
claim that he would not have pled guilty if he had known he would be deportable. See
-20-

Miller, 262 F.3d at 1070 (defendant's assertion that he would have pled not guilty but for
his counsel's ineffective assistance was not credible).
CONCLUSION
By granting the petition at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the post-conviction
court denied the State its day in court on the merits. The Utah Supreme Court has stated
that "[w]hen ensuring litigants have received due process of law, our policy is to resolve
doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a
controversy."

Miller v. USAA Casualty Insur. Co., 2002 UT 6, t 41, 44 P.3d 663

(additional quotations and citations omitted). "At a minimum, a day in court means that
each party shall be afforded the opportunity to present claims and defenses, and have them
properly adjudicated on the merits." Id. at ^f 42.
The post-conviction court in this case did not allow the State to have its day in court
to address the merits of the claims and to present its witnesses, evidence and defenses.
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the
decision granting the petition for post-conviction relief, and remand the case back to the
district court to allow the State to respond on the merits.
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ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument.

"[Ojral argument is a tool for assisting the

appellate court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals,
2005 UT 18, \ 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the
litigant and the bench." Moles v. Regents of Univ. of Calif, 187 Cal.Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal.
1982). In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral
argument." Utah R. App. P. 29(a)(3).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/

day of August, 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Zl

Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney Genera
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this \«^r

day of August 2007,1 mailed, postage prepaid,

two accurate copies of the foregoing Respondent/Appellant's Brief to:
Juan Carlos Colin
4884 Westpoint Dr.
West Valley, UT 84120
(petitioner/appellee pro se)
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JUAN CARLOS COLIN,
FINAL ORDER
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 060920152

STATE OF UTAH,
Judge John Paul Kennedy
Respondent.
ORDER
This Court hereby ORDERS:
1)

That the petition for post-conviction relief filed by petitioner Juan Carlos Colin is

Granted, for the reasons, facts, and conclusions set forth in the Order Granting the Petition.
2)

Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial

court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court having
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-110.
3)

The Court Orders that the State promptly take any necessary action to notify LC.E.

and cooperate in releasing the Petitioner.
DATED this 3 ^ day of March, 2007,

~

wssBagw
APR B3JQ0J
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUAN CARLOS COLIN,
ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 060920152
STATE OF UTAH,
Judge John Paul Kennedy
Respondent.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On November 27, 1996, an Information was filed against petitioner, charging him

with one count of Forcible Sexual Abuse, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
§ 76-5-404.
2.

On February 28,1997, petitioner pled guilty to one count of attempted forcible sexual

abuse, a third degree felony.
3.

On April 11, 1997, petitioner was sentenced to 0 to 5 years in the Utah State prison.

The prison sentence was suspended and petitioner was granted probation for 3 6 months upon
compliance with certain conditions.
4.

Petitioner did not file a timely motion to withdraw plea and did not file any direct

appeal.

\f)b

5.

On June 12,2006, petitioner filed a 402 motion for reduction in sentence. Following

a hearing, the motion was denied and the court's ruling was entered on August 7, 2006.
6.

On November 13,2006, more than nine (9) years after petitioner pled guilty and was

sentenced, he filed an untimely memorandum in support of motion to vacate judgment and
withdraw plea.
7.

On December 18, 2006, Third District Court Judge Deno Himonas entered a ruling

which stated that the motion was in substance a petition for post-conviction relief. Therefore,
the motion was filed as a civil petition for post-conviction relief, as case no. 060920152.
8.

In his petition, the petitioner alleged that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty

plea because 1) "there was not strict compliance with Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure... and 2) the assistance rendered him by defense counsel was ineffective and thus
a violation of the U.S. Const. Amend. VI and Utah Const. Art. I, Section 12." (pet. at p. 1).
Petitioner alleged that counsel erroneously advised him "that a plea to this offense would
not affect his immigration status in the United States." (pet. at p. 2).
9.

Petitioner attached to his petition a document entitled "DECLARATION OF : JUAN

CARLOS COLIN"

10.

Petitioner's declaration stated:
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3. During the entire time that Mr. Johnson and Mr. Quinlan represented me,
they never discussed with me the possible immigration consequences that
would attach to my guilty plea.
4. Mr. Johnson and Mr. Quinlan did speak with me about the time that the
Court would suspended [sic] and the period of time that I would serve in
probation, but they never said nothing about possible consequences with
immigration authorities if I accepted the plea.
5. Specifically, my attorneys never discussed with me any of the following:
a. That I should consult with an immigration attorney before entering my
plea since I was not a U.S. citizen;
b. That my plea would have potential immigration immigration [sic]
consequences as deportation, exclusion from admission to the United
States, or denial of naturalization as a direct consequence of my plea
and subsequent conviction;
c. That I should consider the protection of my legal status in the United
States as a factor in the negotiations of a plea agreement;
d. That the guilty plea I was entering into would constitute a conviction
for an aggravated felony under federal immigration laws and would
make me ineligible for certain forms of immigration rights such as,
Cancellation of Removal as well Asylum [sic] and even Voluntary
Departure.
e. That my plea would make me PERMANENTLY EXCLUDABLE from the
United States and I would risk criminal prosecution and imprisonment
of up to 20 years if I entered the U.S. illegally after being deported as
an aggravated felon.
11.

The final paragraph of petitioner's declaration states: "I declare under penalty of

perjury under the laws of the State of Utah that the foregoing is true and correct." It is then
signed my Mr. Colin and dated November 1, 2006.
12.

On December 29, 2006, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition.
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13.

In its motion to dismiss, the State argued that the petition should be denied and

dismissed with prejudice because it was untimely and petitioner had not met the interests of
justice exception because he failed to assert any reason for the untimely filing of his petition
and because his claims were not meritorious.
14.

On February 27, 2007, oral argument was held on the State's motion to dismiss.

15.

Petitioner appeared pro se by telephone.

16.

Petitioner was not sworn and no objection was raised by the State.

17.

Petitioner clarified his affidavit and stated that his attorneys had misinformed him

about immigration consequences by telling him that he would not be deported. The State was
given the opportunity to question Petitioner, who cooperated and answered the State's
questions, further clarifying his affidavit.
18.

Petitioner stated that for nine years he thought everything was OK. It was only when

ICE came to his house on February 15th of 2006 that he knew there was an immigration
problem
19.

The State was represented by Assistant Attorney General Erin Riley.

20.

The State argued that the petition should be dismissed for the same reasons raised in

the memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss.

21.

In addition, the State argued that if the Court denied its motion to dismiss, an

evidentiary hearing would be necessary to hear testimony from petitioner's trial counsel.
22.

The State made a proffer that it had spoken to petitioner's trial counsel, Mr. Paul

Quinlan by telephone and that he said it was not his practice, in fact he could never remember
ever telling a defendant charged with a felony that he would not be deportable.
23.

The Court indicated that it would accept as true for the purposes of this proceeding

the proffer made by the State.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Court denied the State's motion to dismiss.

2

The Court entered no ruling concerning petitioner's allegation that there was not strict

compliance with Rule 11.
3.

The Court found that the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel was timely because

petitioner raised this claim within one year of discovering the immigration issue.
4.

In addition, even if not timely, the Court found that this issue met the interests of

justice exception.
5.

Accepting the State's proffer as to what Mr. Quinlan would say, Mr. Quinlan's

general statement that it was not his practice, and that he could never remember ever telling

a defendant charged with a felony that he would not be deportable, doesn't overcome
petitioner Colin's specific recollection that he was told that he would not be deported.
6.

The Court therefore granted the petition and vacated the conviction, finding that based

on the facts before the Court and accepting as true all facts proffered by the State, the
Petitioner did not have effective assistance of counsel. The facts showed that Petitioner was
affirmatively informed that his plea would not result in his deportation, when this was
incorrect advice.

2-

CUfnif

DATED t h i s ^ ^ d a y of k f c k , 2007.
BY THE COURT

Kennedy
District CourfTudge
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 060920152 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail
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Dated this

A.
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NAME
COLLEEN K COEBERGH
Attorney PET
29 S STATE ST STE 7
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
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Deputy Court Clerk
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Petitioner,
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vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Judge John Paul Kennedy
Respondent.
ORDER
This Court hereby ORDERS:
1)

That the petition for post-conviction relief filed by petitioner Juan Carlos Colin is

Granted, for the reasons, facts, and conclusions set forth in the Order Granting the Petition.
2)

Under the Post-Conviction Remedies Act, "[a]ny party may appeal from the trial

court's final judgment on a petition for post-conviction relief to the appellate court having
jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-110.
3)

The Court Orders that the State promptly take any necessary action to notify I.C.E.

and cooperate in releasing the Petitioner.
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Addendum B

Westlaw
Page 1
U . C . A . 1953 § 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 1

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*S Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
K
M Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 78-35a-101. Short title
This act shall be known as the "Post-Conviction Remedies Act."
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-101, UT ST § 78-35a-101

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2 007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT

® 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

lAfetlaw
Page
U.C.A.

1953

§

78-35a-102

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*a Chapter 3 5A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*i Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 78-35a-102. Replacement of prior remedies
(1) This chapter establishes a substantive legal remedy for any person who
challenges a conviction or sentence for a criminal offense and who has exhausted
all other legal remedies, including a direct appeal except as provided in
Subsection (2). Procedural provisions for filing and commencement of a petition
are found in Rule 65C, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(2) This chapter does not apply to:
(a) habeas corpus petitions that do not challenge a conviction or sentence for a
criminal offense;
(b) motions to correct a sentence pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure; or
(c) actions taken by the Board of Pardons and Parole.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 2, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-102, UT ST § 78-35a-102

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2 0 07 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT

® 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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Wfestkw
Page 1
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-103

C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*a Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*d Part 1. General Provisions
-f§ 78-35a-103. Applicability--Effect on petitions
Except for the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107/ this chapter
applies only to post-conviction proceedings filed on or after July 1, 1996.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 3, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-103, UT ST § 78-35a-103

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2 007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT

2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

V\festlaw
Page
U.C.A.

1953

§

78-35a-104

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*a Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*H Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 78-35a-104. Grounds for relief--Retroactivity of rule
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who has been
convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action in the district
court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or modify the
conviction or sentence upon the following grounds:
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution;
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected;
(c) the sentence was imposed in an unlawful manner, or probation was revoked in
an unlawful manner;
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; or
(e) newly discovered material evidence exists that requires the court to vacate
the conviction or sentence, because:
(i) neither the petitioner nor petitioner's counsel knew of the evidence at the
time of trial or sentencing or in time to include the evidence in any
previously filed post-trial motion or post-conviction proceeding, and the
evidence could not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable
diligence;
(ii) the material evidence is not merely cumulative of evidence that was known;
(iii) the material evidence is not merely impeachment evidence;

and

(iv) viewed with all the other evidence, the newly discovered material evidence
demonstrates that no reasonable trier of fact could have found the petitioner
guilty of the offense or subject to the sentence received.
(2) The question of whether a petitioner is entitled to the benefit of a rule
announced by the United States Supreme Court, Utah Supreme Court, or Utah Court of
® 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

1

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104
Appeals after the petitioner's conviction became final shall be governed by
applicable state and federal principles of retroactivity.
Laws 1996,

c.

235, § 4, eff. April 29, 1996.

U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-104, UT ST § 78-35a-104

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT

2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U S. Govt. Works.

Westlaw
Page 1
U . C . A . 1953 § 7 8 - 3 5 a - 1 0 5

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
^ Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*$ Part 1. General Provisions
-4§ 78-35a-105. Burden of proof
The petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the facts necessary to entitle the petitioner to relief. The respondent
has the burden of pleading any ground of preclusion under Section 78-35a-106, but
once a ground has been pled, the petitioner has the burden to disprove its
existence by a preponderance of the evidence.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 5, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-105, UT ST § 78-35a-105

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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Westkw,
Page 1
U C A

1953 § 78-35a-106

f>
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78 Judicial Code
Part IV Particular Proceedings
*& Chapter 35A Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*y Part 1
General Provisions
-*§ 78-35a-106. Preclusion of relief--Exception
(1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion,
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal,
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal,
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief or
could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction
relief, or
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, if
the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel
Laws 1996, c
U C A

235, § 6, eff

April 29, 1996

1953 § 78-35a-106, UT ST § 78-35a-106

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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Page 1
U C A. 1953 § 78-35a-107

P>
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*§i Chapter 35A Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*ii Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 78-35a-107. Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
(1) A petitioner is entitled to relief only if the petition is filed within one
year after the cause of action has accrued.
(2) For purposes of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latest of the
following dates:
(a) the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of
conviction, if no appeal is taken;
(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court which has jurisdiction over
the case, if an appeal is taken;
(c) the last day for filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court or the United States Supreme Court, if no petition for writ of certiorari
is filed;
(d) the entry of the denial of the petition for writ of certiorari or the entry
of the decision on the petition for certiorari review, if a petition for writ of
certiorari is filed, or
(e) the date on which petitioner knew or should have known, in the exercise of
reasonable diligence, of evidentiary facts on which the petition is based.
(3) If the court finds that the interests of justice require, a court may excuse a
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations
(4) Sections 77-19-8, 78-12-35, and 78-12-40 do not extend the limitations period
established m this section.
Laws 1995, c. 82, § 1, eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1996, c. 235, § 7, eff. April 29,
1996, Laws 2004, c 139, § 2, eff. May 3, 2004.
Codifications C. 1953, § 78-12-31 1.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2004, c

139, in subsec. (4) added "77-19-8"
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U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107
Prior Laws:
Laws 1979, c. 133.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-107, UT ST § 78-35a-107

Current through 2 0 07 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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Wstlaw
Page
U.C.A.

1953

§

78-35a-108

c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
K
M Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*B Part 1. General Provisions
-•§ 78-35a-108. Effect of granting relief--Notice
(1) If the court grants the petitioner's request for relief, it shall either:
(a) modify the original conviction or sentence;

or

(b) vacate the original conviction or sentence and order a new trial or
sentencing proceeding as appropriate.
(2)(a) If the petitioner is serving a felony sentence, the order shall be stayed
for five days. Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice
to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will pursue a new trial or
sentencing proceedings, appeal the order, or take no action.
(b) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice at any time during
the stay period that it intends to take no action, the court shall lift the stay
and deliver the order to the custodian of the petitioner.
(c) If the respondent gives notice that it intends to retry or resentence the
petitioner, the trial court may order any supplementary orders as to arraignment,
trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 8, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-108, UT ST § 78-35a-108

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*H Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*ai Part 1. General Provisions
-+§ 78-35a-109. Appointment of counsel
(1) If any portion of the petition is not summarily dismissed, the court may,
upon the request of an indigent petitioner, appoint counsel on a pro bono basis.
Counsel who represented the petitioner at trial or on the direct appeal may not be
appointed to represent the petitioner under this section.
(2) In determining whether to appoint counsel, the court shall consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the petition contains factual allegations that will require an
evidentiary hearing; and
(b) whether the petition involves complicated issues of law or fact that require
the assistance of counsel for proper adjudication.
(3) An allegation that counsel appointed under this section was ineffective cannot
be the basis for relief in any subsequent post-conviction petition.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 9, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-109, UT ST § 78-35a-109

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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c
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 78. Judicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings
*£ Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Refs & Annos)
*ii Part 1. General Provisions
-+§ 78-35a-110. Appeal--Jurisdiction
Any party may appeal from the trial court's final judgment on a petition for
post-conviction relief to the appellate court having jurisdiction pursuant to
Section 78-2-2 or 78-2a-3.
Laws 1996, c. 235, § 10, eff. April 29, 1996.
U.C.A. 1953 § 78-35a-110, UT ST § 78-35a-110

Current through 2007 General Legislative Session.

Copr ® 2007 Thomson/West

END OF DOCUMENT
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C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*! Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings
•4RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and Venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the
district court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms
provided by the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the
wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or
witnesses.
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality
of the conviction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be
raised in subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in
which the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the
petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the
results of the appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other
civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the
results of the prior proceeding; and
(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous
post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any pnor post-conviction or other civil pioceedmg that
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence, and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in
the petition, but these may be set out m a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the
petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who
sentenced the petitioner If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in
the normal course
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims The assigned judge shall review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the
court that any claim has been adjudicated in a pnor proceeding, or if any claim m the petition appears frivolous on
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been
adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner Proceedings
on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the order of dismissal The order of dismissal need not recite findings
of fact or conclusions of law
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and
attachments, it appears that
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis m fact, or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expned pnor to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading ercor or failure to comply with the
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend withm 20 days The court
may grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition in a case where the
petitioner is sentenced to death
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not
be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the
clerk to serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is
a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the state of Utah represented by the Attorney
General In all other cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner
(i) Answer or Other Response Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after
service of a copy of the petition upon the respondent, or withm such other penod of time as the court may allow,
the respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that have not been dismissed and
shall serve the answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Withm 30 days (plus
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner
may respond by memorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered
by the court
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Works
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(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise
dispose of the case The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to
delay unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition At the prehearing conference, the court may
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues,
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents, and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the
petitioner is not represented by counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or
video conferencing The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not
otherwise be present m court during the proceeding The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility
where the petitioner is confined
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a
party and a determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with
evidence that is likely to be admissible at an evidentiary hearing The court may order either the petitioner or the
respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records
(m) Orders; Stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of fact and conclusions of law and
an appropriate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5
days Within the stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the
respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the order, or take no action Thereafter the stay
of the order is governed by these rules and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notce that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the
court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be
necessary and proper
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems
appropriate If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that
prosecuted the petitioner If the petitioner is m the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and
Sections 78-7-36 through 78-7- 43 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court
of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts
[Adopted effective July 1, 1996 ]
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule replaces former paragraph (b) of Rule 65B It governs proceedings challenging a conviction or sentence,
regardless whether the claim relates to an original commitment, a commitment for violation of probation, or a
© 2007 Thomson/West No Claim to Ong U S Govt Woiks

Addendum D

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH vs. JUAN CARLOS COLIN
CASE NUMBER 971900070 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 7 6-5-4 04 - ATTEMPTED FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE 2nd Degree
Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: February 28, 1997 Not Guilty
Disposition: February 28, 1997 {Guilty Plea}

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
DENO HIMONAS
PARTIES
Defendant - JUAN CARLOS COLIN
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: BLAKE A NAKAMURA
Other Party - SHELLY A MOSER
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: JUAN CARLOS COLIN
Offense tracking number: 7881766
Date of Birth: May 19, 1963
Law Enforcement Agency: MURRAY CITY POLICE
LEA Case Number: 96-15671
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY
Violation Date: November 22, 1996
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
VENUE

Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Balance:

1,,016.,50
li,016,,50
0..00
0..00

Trust Due:
Amount Paid:
Credit:
Trust Balance Due:
Balance Payable:

150,.00
150,.00
0,.00
0,.00
0,.00

>TALS

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: FINE
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Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1,000.00
1,000.00
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

1.50
1.50
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

2.25
2.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

0.25
0.25
0.00
0.00

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
Amount Credit:
Balance:

12.50
12.50
0.00
0.00

TRUST DETAIL
Trust Description: Attorney Fees
Recipient: LEGAL DEFENDERS
Amount Due:
150.00
Paid In:
150.00
Paid Out:
150.00
CASE NOTE
BEEHIVE BOND

**SPANISH INTERPRETER NEEDED**

PROCEEDINGS
01-21-97 Judge BRIAN assigned.
01-21-97 Arraignment scheduled on January 24, 1997 at 10:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - S42 with Judge BRIAN.
01-21-97 Note: Case filed from Circuit Court bindover.
01-21-97 Note: ARR
scheduled for 1/24/97 at 10:30 A in room G
with PBB
01-21-97 Information filed
01-24-97 Arraignment scheduled on February 07, 1997 at 10:30 AM in
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01-24' -97
01-24- 97
01-24- 97
01-24- 97
01-24-97
01-24- 97
01-24- 97
02-07- 97
02-0702-0702-0702-07-

97
97
97
97

02-07- •97
02-07- •97
02-07- 97
02-07- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
02-28- 97
03-04- 97
04-09- 97
04-11- 97
04-11- •97
04-11- •97
04-11- 97
04-11- •97
04-11- •97
04-11- •97
04-11- •97
04-11- •97

Fourth Floor - S42 with Judge BRIAN.
Note: Continuance
JUDGE: PAT B BRIAN
Note:
Deft Present
Note:
Deft advised of rights
Note:
ATD: SHAPIRO, DAVID
ATP: GOODMAN, KATIE
BERNARDS
Note:
scheduled for 02/07/97 at 1030 A in room G
ARR
with PBB
Note:
CUSTODY: Bail Continued
Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY: HRG CONTINUED
DISPOSITION HEARING scheduled on February 28, 1997 at 10:30 AM
in Fourth Floor - S42 with Judge BRIAN.
Note: Fel Arraignment
JUDGE: PAT B BRIAN
Note:
ATD: STAM, KAREN
ATP: STOTT, ROBERT
Note:
Deft is present
Note:
DSP
scheduled for 02/28/97 at 1030 A in room G
with PBB
CUSTODY: Pre-Trial Services
Note:
Chrg: 76-5-404
Plea: Not Guilty
Note:
INTERPRETER WAS PRESENT AND SWORN AT HRNG ON
Note:
2/7/97-DSP HRNG
SET FOR 2/28/97 @ 10:30 AM
Note:
Note: Change of Plea
JUDGE: PAT B BRIAN
Note:
ATD: QUINLAN, PAUL C.
ATP: NAKAMURA, BLAKE
Note:
Deft is present
Note:
Deft advised of rights
Note:
PSI Ordered from ADULT PROBATION & PAROLE
Note:
SNT
scheduled for 04/11/97 at 1030 A in room G
with PBB
Note:
Chrg: 76-5-404
Finding: Guilty Plea
Note: Charge 76-5-404 Sev F2 was amended to 76-5-404 Sev F3
Note: FILED: MINUTE ENTRY: DEF PLEADS G TO CNT I (AMENDED)-DEF
SIGNS
PLEA AGMT-PSI ORDERED-SNT SET FOR 4/11/97 @ 10:30
Note:
AM
Note: FILED: FILED: STMT OF DEF, CERT OF COUNSEL & ORDER
Note: FILED: PRE-SENTENCE/PROBATION REFERRAL FORM
Sentencing scheduled on April 11, 1997 at 10:30 AM in Fourth
Floor - S4 2 with Judge BRIAN.
Note: FILED: AP&P PRE-SENT INVESTIGATION REPORT (CONFIDENTIAL)
Note: JUDGMENT - FORCIBLE SEX ABUSE
Note: 2214641
Note: DATE: 4-16-97
Note: TIME: 8:12 AM
Note: NOTE: SEE FILE
Note: Sentence: Judge PAT B BRIAN
Note:
REPORTER: BRAD YOUNG
Note:
Deft present with Counsel, Prosecutor present
Note:
Chrg: ATT FORC SEX ABUSE
Plea: Not Guilty Find:
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Guilty Plea
04-11-97 Note:
FINE AMOUNT:
5000.00
SUSPENDED:
4000.00
04-11-97 Note:
005
YEARS
SUSPENDED:
5 YEARS
04-11-97 Note: DEF GRANTED PROB FOR 36 MOS-DEF TO COMPLY WITH ALL TERMS
OF
04-11-97 Note: PROBATION AS PER ORDER OF THE COURT-DEF TO PAY FINE OF
$1,000
04-11-97 Note: (INCLUDING SURCHARGE)
04-11-97 Note:
Fines and assessments entered: FS
1000.00
04-11-97 Note:
SB
850.00
04-11-97 Note:
Total fines and assessments..:
1850.00
04-11-97 Note: FILED: JUDGMENT, SENTENCE (COMMITMENT)
04-14-97 Fine Account created
Total Due:
1000.00
04-16-97 Trust Account created
Total Due:
150.00
12-23-97 Fine
Payment Received:
1,000.00
12-23-97 Attorney Fees
Payment Received:
150.00
12-23-97 Filed: Satisfaction of Judgment Re: Criminal Fine Surcharge
Recoupment Fee and/or Restitution (2214641) (97-864)
02-12-98 Note: Check #3663 payee changed to from
02-12-98 Attorney Fees Check #
3663 Trust Payout:
150.00
06-01-99 Filed: AP&P Progress/Violation Report
08-06-04 Fee Account created
Total Due:
1.50
08-06-04 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
1.50
Note: 2.00 cash tendered.
06-12-06 Filed: Motion for Reduction
06-14-06 Judge HIMONAS assigned.
06-23-06 Filed: State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a 402
Reduction
06-27-06 Filed: Letters from friends and family in reference to
reduction of sentence
07-06-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
PRESENT
Clerk:
patj
Defendant not present

HEARING
The court received a letter from Shelly Moser today.
A copy of the letter is enclosed
07-18-06 Filed: Letter from Jeffrey Noland
07-19-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971900070 ID 6684924
HEARING-402 REDUCTION is scheduled.
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Date: 07/28/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S44
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
07-19-06 HEARING-402 REDUCTION scheduled on July 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - S4 4 with Judge HIMONAS.
07-19-06 HEARING-402 REDUCTION scheduled on July 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
Fourth Floor - S4 4 with Judge HIMONAS.
07-19-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971900070 ID 6684935
HEARING-4 02 REDUCTION.
Date: 7/28/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S44
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
The reason for the change is Notice needs to be mailed to parties,
07-19-06 HEARING-402 REDUCTION Cancelled.
07-28-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Hearing
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
PRESENT
Clerk:
patj
Prosecutor: SHUMAN, JON D
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): VELEZ, A JASON

Video
Tape Count: 10.02
HEARING
COUNT: 10.02
This case is before the court for a hearing on a motion for 402
reduction.
The motion is argued to the court by respective counsel and
submitted.
The court takes its ruling under advisement.
08-04-06 Filed: State's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a 402
Reduction
08-07-06 Filed: Court's ruling: the court denies the motion for a 402
reduction
08-30-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
2.25
08-30-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
2.25
09-22-06 Fee Account created
Total Due:
0.25
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09-22-06 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
0.25
Note: 1.00 cash tendered.
0.75 change given.
10-19-06 Filed: Motion for Formal Hearing to Appeal Decision for a 402
Reduction
10-24-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971900070 ID 6775031
APPEAL OF 402 DECISION is scheduled.
Date: 11/03/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S4 4
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
10-24-06 APPEAL OF 402 DECISION scheduled on November 03, 2006 at 09:00
AM in Fourth Floor - S44 with Judge HIMONAS.
11-02-06 Filed: Motion for Withdrawal of Counsel
11-03-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Review Hearing
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
PRESENT
Clerk:
patj
Prosecutor: CASSELL, PATRICIA S
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): VELEZ, A JASON

Video
Tape Count: 9.30
HEARING
COUNT: 9.30
Appeal motion stricken. Ms Mozier is not an attorney and cannot
represent the deft.
Jason Velez 1 motion to withdraw as counsel granted.
Deft f s 402 motion has previously been ruled on.
11-03-06 Filed: Withdrawal of Counsel
11-13-06 Filed: Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Judgment and
Withdraw Plea: Points and Authorities in Support: Declaration
of Defendant in Support Thereof
11-15-06 Notice - NOTICE for Case 971900070 ID 6795263
SCHEDULING CONF is scheduled.
Date: 12/15/2006
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - S44
Third District Court
450 South State
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: DENO HIMONAS
11-15-06 SCHEDULING CONF scheduled on December 15, 2006 at 09:00 AM in
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Fourth Floor - S4 4 with Judge HIMONAS.
12-15-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Law and Motion
Judge:
DENO HIMONAS
PRESENT
Clerk:
wendypg
Prosecutor: NELSON, STEPHEN L
Defendant not present

Video
Tape Count: 11-21
HEARING
Defendant not present - housed Arizona Prison. State has not
received a copy of the Motion to Vacate Judgment. Case continued
without date.
12-18-06 Minute Entry - RULING - POST CONVICTION RELIEF
Judge: DENO HIMONAS
Having reviewed the Defendant's pro se Motion, the Court is of the
opinion that it is in substance, even if not in name, a petition
for post-conviction relief. (see complete Ruling in file) copy of
ruling sent to all parties.
12-28-06 Filed: Motion for Release of Record and Transcripts
01-02-07 Filed order: Order Releasing Record and Transcripts
Judge dhimonas
Signed December 29, 2006
01-02-07 Filed: State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion
to Vacate Judgment and Withdraw Plea
01-18-07 Filed: Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Memorandum in Support
of State's Motion to Dismiss Petition
(060920152)
02-16-07 Fee Account created
Total Due:
12.50
02-16-07 COPY FEE
Payment Received:
12.50
Note: 20.00 cash tendered.
7.50 change given.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE CITY
2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3
4

-oOoJUAN CARLOS COLIN,

5
6
7
8

Petitioner,

Case No. 06092152
S T A T E D MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.
"TATh" OF UTAH,
Respondent.

9
-oOo10
11
BE IT REMEMBERED that ^
12

the 27th day ~^

February, 2007, commencing --t "he hour of 1:39 : . -1

the

13
bove-entitled matter came

•

?.-.:••

14
HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY, sitting as Judge in the
15
above-named Court for the purpose of this cause, and that
1G
IT

the loll owing proceedings were had.
-oOo-

18

A P P E A R A N C E S

19
20
21

"or the Petitioner:

Appearing Telephonically
Pro Se

•or the Respondent:

ERIN RILEY
A s s i s t a n t Attorney General
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
S a l t Lake C i t y , U t a h H L ^ m

22
23

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

24

MAY I S 2007

25

2.0CT7OZI \-CA
ALAN P. SMITH, CSR
385 BRAHMA DRIVE (801) 266-0320
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84107

nmaihiAi

1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3
4

THE COURT:

All right.

We're here in the matter of

the petition of Juan Colin.

5

You're on the phone, sir?

6

MR. COLIN:

Yes, your Honor.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

8

representing the State?

9
10
11
12

And we have in the courtroom

MS. RILEY:

Erin Riley from the Attorney General's

THE COURT:

Okay.

Office.
Ms. Riley, if you'd like to come

up closer to the phone, you're welcome to do that.

13

MS. RILEY:

Okay.

Thank you.

14

THE COURT:

We set this matter today to consider

15

some issues relating to the petition that has been filed and

16

any the other matters that need to be brought up.

17

to me that when we talked about this the last time, when the

18

petitioner was not available but was represented not

19

officially, there were some issues that came up with respect

20

to certain allegations in the petition; is that—is that—do I

21

remember correctly, Ms. Riley?

22

MS. RILEY:

It seemed

Well, essentially, your Honor, he filed

23

a petition and we haven't responded on the merits, we simply

24

filed a motion to dismiss.

25

THE COURT: Right.

MS. RILEY:

So, I think that's what has to be dealt

with first and I think the issue had to do with some of the
allegations that he had made in his declaration and in his
petition,
THE COURT:

I !:: seemed to in< =; 1 :liat the biggest concern

I have, Mr,, Colin, is that at one point in your petition, you
made a statement to the effect that it had been r e p r e — t h a t * ••"
t

* ;t

I: x \i t<: it : < acol 1 ect exactly

,'

-

eemed

•,-. :\hat there was a conflicting statement* one w,%s that no

one had said anything to you about the immigration
consequences of yoi lr plea .

. -

MR. COLIN:

Correct.

THE COURT:

And then at one point in your petition,

. asserted affirmatively t:i lat—-that—that you were

told, as I recall.
Can you refresh my recollection on that, M s . Riley,
i f you would?
MS. RILEY:

Your Honor, in the petition, he said

several different things.

He said they failed to adequately

advise him, that he was misled, that they neglected
adequately inform him and that he was misinformed as to the
immigration consequences.

So, he's k m a

seems

either making two statements or else not clarifying.
And then in his declaration attached to the
pet i t i o i i, a n d I h

- i c o p y o f t h a t f • :D r th e 2 o i i r t ,

ie,

like, starting down in Paragraphs 3 and 4, he says that his
counsel never discussed with him the possible immigration
consequences.

So, I think we need to clarify that, whether

they never discussed it with him, which he's considering
failing to adequately advise him, or if he's alleging that
they actively misled him and if so, what he's claiming they
said to him.
MR. COLIN:

(Inaudible) your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yeah.

That's what I would like to hear

MR. COLIN:

Okay.

They—they told me—they—they—

from you.

my counsel, he—he told me I would not get deported, okay?
The other thing he, when I (inaudible) the immigration
consequences about, you know, because this, I knew it had to
be innocent, meanwhile, he never told me that.

He told me I

no longer get deported, (inaudible) he handle it, he know—he
says he know—I know—immigrant (inaudible) he told me, you
know, not going to have any problems, you know, I—I don't
want to get deported, because he never—I wanted to make sure
that (inaudible) the consequence about the future when I try
to be a citizen, you know, or in case they take my—my—my
papers away and I can deported for life, you know, he didn't
tell me that.
When—when he—when I—I say (inaudible) he told me,
you know, there's not going to be any problem, okay, I go
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b a c k — g o back to my normal life, y o u know, .• don't want to g e t
deported, okay, understand that, I — I — t h e issue about the
iimmigration consequences about i n — i n the future, (inaudible)
to be a citizen, I (inaudible) know it's going to affect m e ,
v.iU K n 0

w , J /£ just as soon go to t r i a l , yen i know, because why

/;*u qoing to try'and. (inaudible) when I do not try to rape •
somebody, i try to have a — a normal life, when in the future,
y 01 i ki 10* , IJ III going t :> become a (I naudib] e) ::i:i tizen, you know ,
my h o m e , my family are h e r e , my kids and my w i f e , you know.
THE C O U R T :

Okay.

Thank y< : >i i .

When—-when did he te] ] yen 1 tha t you weren' t goii ig to
be deported?

Did he tell you that before you made your plea

or after?
•;. '

MR. COI J N :

Wl :u = i ii y ou

- because at- • a f: oi :ie

point, the agreement on i t , you know, when he tried :
m e , he explained to m e the trial proceedings, you know,
to t r i a l ,
maybe \

f

re

r

... ;

t---'~
:

:~

s going to be hard :-ri\

going to ]o.:e, he n o tell m e exactly w h a t — y o u

know, what the trial i s , you know.
THE COUR.

W h e n — w h e n did .e z:-:

MR. COLIN:

(Inaudible) you g o t a good d e a l —

—

THE COURT: M r . - MR. COLIN:

— y o u ' r e going t o — y o u ' re going to b e

free, (inaudible) i s , you know, y o u need—-you on probation and
do

p r 0 b a t i o n and the o n e thing the Coi irt asks yoi i t< :> do ai i< :i
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1

you'll go back to your life, you know.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR, COLIN:

And (inaudible) any kind of problems,

4

All right.

you know, you can handle.

5

THE COURT:

6

you you would not be deported.

7

you—

8
9

MR. COLIN:

Mr. Colin, tell me when the lawyer told
Did he tell ;/ou that before

Before I say, you know , before—before

and after, you know, he say—

10

THE COURT:

Both before and after?

11

MR. COLIN:

Uh huh.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

13

MR. COLIN:

He say, before he say, take this, it is

14

a good deal, :Lt's not going to be affected with your

15

nationality, :Lt will not be affected (inaudible) and you know,

16

you go back to—it's a good deal, you know.

17

THE COURT:

All right.

18

MR. COLIN:

You do it, you do it, (inaudible) good

1

19

thing :r do not sign a paper, you're going to get deported, you

20

know, \*rtiy is—-you know, I —

21
22

THE COURT:

Okay.

I think we got it.

Hold on a

second now.

23

MR. COLIN:

Okay.

24

THE COURT:

Ms. Riley, do you have any questions you

25

would like to ask him?
6

U S . RILEY:

No, I d i d — w e l l , I did have a few

additional things to advise the Court about, though.
'•''•'THE COURT:

C1J ; < ty

i \ ] 1 :i : I ght.

Thank you.

We'i e —

what else would you like to advise the Court, M s . Riley?
MS. RILEY:

I think mainly, your Honor, just to

clarify the State's position, our motion to dismiss is because
the petition is untimely,

And he raised basically two issues

:iII that petition, the first dealt with his claim that the plea
was not in strict compliance with Rule 3]

And our position

is that there is no reason at all to proceed on that claim,
because there's

\

-

ed earlier ai id

it's also not meritorious.
And I have looked at the file and \t

appears t h a t —

M**.

i!

-.

:• . - .

.:u. , .-i.- )

~nat—

THE COURT:

Wait just a minute, Mr. Colin.

MS. RILEY:

It appears to me, first of all, that

Ru] e 1 ] was f o] ] owed , but :i i 1 f ac tJ( :i i i a pos t-convi ction case ,
even if strict compliance with Rule 11 was not followed,
that's not sufficient for post-conviction.
establish tha t there was some k

..*

He must still

• ^ --isti tutiona] v:i olati c >n

with the plea, which his petition does not do*
And second, we are also arguing that the claim about
ineffecti ve assistance of counsel d€ a] j ng w:i t h til :i s
immigration consequences plea is also untimely,
no question that it is untimely.

And there's

He pled ten years ago, so
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the question is, does he meet the interests of justice
exception?

In other words, can he explain why he waited so

long to file and in addition, is the claim meritorious?
MR. COLIN:

Just—

MS, RILEY:

Now, he's attempted in some ways to say

why he waited so long to file, which is he claims that he
didn't know there were immigration consequences until
immigration came to pick him up.

Now, we still need to check

the dates on that to make sure that he still filed the same
year of that happening.

If he did, then we need to look at

the meritoriousness of the claim.
Claiming that his counsel didn't tell him anything
about immigration is not sufficient and he would lose, that is
not a meritorious claim, because counsel's not required to
give advice on collateral consequences.

And—

MR. COLIN:

The Fifth Amendment say that—

MS. RILEY:

It—it—

THE COURT: Wait just a second, Mr. Colin.
have a chance to respond.

You'll

Okay?

MR. COLIN:

I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT:

Go ahead, Ms. Riley.

MS. RILEY:

The Federal Courts and the Utah Supreme

Court have clearly said that immigration consequences are
collateral consequences of a plea; so if they told him nothing
about immigration consequences, then there's no bias or no
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problem.
N o w , h e also w a s claiming, though, that they did
(j i ve h i m — t h a t they mi sadvised 1 i:i in <:>i : t: .old him 1 1 "•ol ! '1 n o t ^
deported.

In that c a s e , if t h e Court is inclined to df-ny :;.

motion t o dismiss a s untimely, asserting that that m a y m e e t
neritoriousness claim, -. mept t-hP interests of justice
exception, then I believe w e would need an evidentiary hearing
to call M r . Quinlan. .
There's nothing from M r . Quinlan in the file y e t .
All we have is statements from M r . Colin (inaudible) b u t I
could make a proffer f o r t h e Court t

•

.,h'e upokon to Hi ,

Quinlan and t h a t h e advised m e that h e does n o t remember this
case specifically, since it's t e n years a g o , b u t that it is
not h i s norma] practice ai id tha t i i 1 fact, tie coul d never
recall ever telling anyone charged with a felony that they
would n o t b e deportable.
• ' .-'

,

So ( "I Hie L'OIK t* denies th-'« motion t" <!JSHUSS and

allows the petition to proceed, 1 th

k we need an evidentiary

hearing to put on testimony from his trial counsel, Mr.
Quinl an, aboi it that issue, as we] ] as statements from Mr.
(inaudible)
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Colin, it's yoi lr turn.

MR. COI JI I: OJ :a.y , Y our Hoi .or , tl lei i jus t I

to

tell something, y o u know, it's like I would ask y o u like t h a t
and approach i t , y o u k n o w , because I don't have a law d e g r e e ,

9

I don't know a lot about law, you know.

It's only, you know,

what she say, the time has already passed, yeah, because you
know, for nine years, I thought everything is—is okay in my
life, it's only, you know, in February 15 is—is when I—I
realized I made a bad deal, you know, to say that my plea
guilt—plead guilty, you know, my plea bargain is when I c a n —
to my—to my house, with no reason just because I have a
felony and you know, and—and on May 24 is when the judge
order the deportation; yet, you know, I have a—my son is here
and in—in the United States, you know, is why I'm trying to
take a little step this year, you know, because I don't think
it's fair to—to—(inaudible) the petitioner say you have to
have the right to buy from you confidence—
THE COURT:

Do you want t o —

MR. COLIN:

— m y confidence is on the (inaudible)

when I go to court and I didn't want to take this deal, what
is the point, you know, then I get deported; I'd just as soon
go to trial and see (inaudible)
THE COURT: Okay,
MR. COLIN:

And I take the deal.

THE COURT: All right. And you say that you first
learned about this in May of last year?
MR. COLIN:

You know, they (inaudible) okay, it was

as—as—came to my house to pick me up.
THE COURT: What year?

This year or last year?
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MR. COLIN:

Last year.

THE C O U R T :

Okay.

MR. COLII

. :•; , y e a r .

And on May 2 4 , i w a s — I — a n d ,

~--and m y ( i n a u d i b l e ) and in E x h i b i t 1, P e t i t i o n E x h i b i t 1 it
is I am o r d e r e d to r e m o v e from u n i t e d S t a t e s oi i M a y 24th
b e c a u s e I'm a — b e c a u s e of t h i s f e l o n y .
THE COURT;
M R . COI ,";:

>M, IJ 'I you h.i ;e thif*

attachment.
THE COURT:
;

-•' '

that I — I

All r i g h t .

MR. COL «

Anything f u r t h e r —

••

•• A, I fi ] ed t .his petition

(inaudible) t h r o u g h — i n February ;

vhen I came to my

house and pick m e u p , you k n o w , ; complete (inaudible)
l(

~ .

from

T--I--I

learned about the consequences of t h i s .
THE COURT:

0k< iy,

All right. - Thank you.

An\. M'i Lng fi ir thei: fr o m
MS. RILEY:

^

•;

- t: -ii.tr

Yes, your Honor,

1 realized I do h a v e

one more q u e s t i o n for M r . C o l i n w e need t o ask and t h a t i s ,
t h a 1. :i i i 1 i i s j: > e t I t i o i i, h e said 11 i a t 1: :t i s c o u i :i s e 1, M r . J ohn son
and Mr. Quinlan never discussed possible
consequences with him.
luiidi i'h

.iionnMuii ever

immigration

And 1 need to know if he's

alleging

no I it n im 1 le wc i O dn' t be deported,

because M r . J o h n s o n , his bar status is inactive in U t a h , he's
apparently moved to Nevada to work.

S o / I need to know

if—if
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he's also making a claim against Mr, Johnson, whether we also
need to contact him or of it's just Mr, Quinlan he's claiming
made these statements.
THE COURT:

Do you understand that question?

MR, COLIN:

Uh huh.

You know—you know, Mr. Quinlan

is the one I always talked to, okay.
represented me.

He's the one who

He's supposed to be my counselor.

MS. RILEY:

It does appear that he was there the

majority of the time on the docket.
THE COURT:

There were other—

You don't remember getting an advice

from Mr. Johnson, do you?
MR. COLIN:

As I say, both—both of—what—what I

remember is no, (inaudible) told me you will not get deported.
And as a consequence—as a consequence, I—you know, I
(inaudible) I know when I have a chance because of the felony,
okay?

That is consequence.

See, if--if you are here when—

when he told me I will not get deported, so is what I'm trying
to do in the interests of justice here, because you know, is
why I take the plea bargain because he prom—well, I mean, he
not promise, all he—he told me I would not get deported.
THE COURT:

All right.

Thank you, Mr. Colin.

MR. COLIN:

And your Honor, I'm sorry, you know, I —

I tell you before, you know, I'm not—I'm not (inaudible) and
the reason that I want to go for this is because my
(inaudible) in English, you know, I am kind of nervous, you
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know.
THE COURT: All right.

I've got it. Thank you very

much.
MR. COLIN:

I (inaudible) you know, I—I (inaudible)

memorize this and everything is in there.
THE COURT: All right. Well, what I have in front
of me here, it seems to me, is a—first of all, a question
with respect to the timeliness of the—of the motion.

It

seems to me that the motion—or the petition is timely in that
he's brought it within one year of the time that he discovered
the problem; namely, this issue with respect to the advice he
received or didn't receive with respect to deportation.

So, I

think it's a timely—it's a timely petition in that sense.
Secondly, even if it weren't, under Adams, the court
was supposed to consider the interests of justice and—and try
to determine whether there's merit to the petition.

It—it

seems to me that the argument that he's making is ineffective
assistance of counsel, which really does, in essence, raise a
Constitutional issue; so, the question then comes down to
whether the cases support the contention that he was denied
effective assistance.
And as I understand those cases, they turn on the
question of whether he was mis-advised or just not advised.
If he is told nothing about deportation, then he cannot claim
that he was given ineffective assistance.

On the other hand,
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if he was given mis-advice and told, don't worry, you won't be
deported, then that would fall into the mis-advice category
and would constitute ineffective assistance.
In this case, the State has made a proffer that Mr.
Quinlan, if called to testify, would testify that he does not
remember the specific facts of this case, but that his
practice would be normally to adhere to the requirements o f —
of good—good counsel•
Accepting that proffer and giving it the maximum
force that I think it could be given, I still don't think it
would go to extent of contradicting what I hear over the
phone, as Mr. Colin's specific recollection of—of the event
and his specific recollection of the event is that he was told
he would not be deported and he based his plea on that advice
and he would not have pled otherwise, if—if he—or he would
not have pled guilty if he had been instructed that there
might be immigration consequences, which could lead to his de-deport—deportation.
So, given all of that, I find that the petition has
merit and as a result, I'm—I'm going to—I'm going to grant
his petition and I'm going to vacate his plea of guilty and
leave it to the State as to whether or not they wish to refile the Information against him and bring the charges anew.
So, at this point, Mr. Colin, I am vacating your
conviction and allowing you to withdraw your plea and vacating
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your conviction.

Do you understand?

MR. COLIN:

Your Honor—

THE COURT:

Do you understand that?

MR. COLIN:

Thank you, your Honor, you know what—

thank you, you know, (inaudible) all my family, all my
(inaudible) are here and I —
THE COURT:

I—I—

MR. COLIN:

—and I —

THE COURT:

I understand.

I understand what you're

saying and appreciate that, but I'm—what I'm going to do in
addition is, I'm going to allow the State to prepare the
appropriate order and submit that to us. Okay?
I don't know how—I don't know how long it'll take
to get all of this done, but anyway, that's what we've done
here so far.

Okay?

MR. COLIN:

(Inaudible) my case again, huh?

THE COURT:

Say again?

MR. COLIN:

So, my case is (Inaudible)

THE COURT:

It is vacated as of now, but there's

going to be a written order and the State will prepare that
and it'll probably take some time for the red tape to be
processed.

Do you understand?

MR. COLIN:

Okay, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.
MS. RILEY:

And your Honor, I do have two additional
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matters.

Is the Court making a ruling on whether the claim

concerning the compliance with Rule 11 was timely or not?
THE COURT:

I don't think I need to rule on that

issue at this time, given the ruling that I've made.
MS. RILEY:

And the second thing, your Honor, is

that we would object to the Court ruling on the actual
petition today, since we—all we've done—all the State has
had the opportunity to do so far is file the motion to
dismiss, because it's untimely.

If the Court's going to rule

on the actual petition, we would ask for an evidentiary
hearing to bring Mr. Quinlan in to testify so that his
testimony is on the record for appeal.
THE COURT: Well, I've given you the maximum benefit
of—of your proffer, so I don't know that his testimony would
add anything.

If you—we can bring him into court and he

could testify, but if he's only going to say what you've said,
I've already given you credit for that.
MS. RILEY:

Well, at this point, your Honor, he

hasn't had the chance to go back and look at the file to see
if there might be notes in there or additional information.

I

just think it's difficult to appeal simply based on a
proffer—
(Dial tone in the background)
THE COURT:

We've lost our guy.

MS. RILEY:

—without any actual testimony.
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THE CLERK:

Do you want me to get him back again?

THE COURT:

Yeah.

THE CLERK:

I'm still getting a busy signal.

Try and get him back on.

(Inaudible) on that end.
Still busy.
(Inaudible)
THE COURT: Well-(Inaudible)
THE COURT:

It's a prison.

I guess (inaudible)
Well, I don't think we need him on the line.

I'm

just—I'm going to stand by my ruling and with respect to the
evidentiary aspect of it, as I say, I've given you credit for
what your proffer was and even in the face of that—
MS. RILEY:

That was pretty short, your Honor.

Would the Court consider allowing an affidavit from Mr.
Quinlan to be submitted on this matter?
THE COURT:

File a Rule 60(b) here, or Rule—you

know, whatever you want to do; but prepare the order.
MS. RILEY:

And may we just advise the Court, I

don't know if we can reach Mr. Quinlan within five days,
(inaudible) the letter will get to the prison, but I don't
know if it will get to him within five days, but we will
either appeal or re-file the charges, so—just so that that's
on the record.

Okay?
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THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. RILEY:

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.)

* * *
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DECLARATION OF: JUAN CARLOS COLIN
1/ Juan Carlos Colin declare as follows:
1- I am the sole Defendant in: State of Utah V- Juan Carlos
Colin, No, 971900070.
I hcive personal knowledge of the facta
set forth therein for which I entered a guilty plea.
2- On February 28, 1997, upon the advice of appointed public
defenders, Kevin L- Johnson and Paul C- Quinlan/ I agreed to
enter a plea of guilty tc a violation of Utah Code Ann- §
76-5-404, Attempted Forcible Sex Abuse, in exchange of suspension
of sentence with 36 months under supervision [probation].
3. During the entire time that Mr- Johnson and Mr. Quinlan
represented me, they neveir discussed- with me the possible
immigration consequences thai: would attach to my guilty plea.
4- Mr- Johnson and Mr. Quinlan did speak with me about the time
that the Court would suspended and the period of time that I
would serve in probation,, but they never said nothing about possible
consequences with immigration authorities if I accepted the plea.
5. Specifically, my attorneys never discussed with me any of the
following:
a- That I should consult with an immigration attorney before
entering my plea since I was not a U-S- citizen;
b- That my plea would have potential immigration immigration
conseuqnces as deportation, exclusion from admission to the
United
States/
or
denial
of
naturalization
as
a
direct
consequence of my plea and subsequent conviction?
c. That I should consider the protection of my legal status in
the United States as a factor in the negotiations of a plea
agreement;
d. That the guilty plea "I was entering into would constitute a
conviction for an aggravated felony under federal immigration
laws and would
make me ineligible for certain
forms of
immigration rights such as, Cancellation of Removal as well
Asylum and even Voluntary Departure?
e- That my plea would make me PERMANENTLY EXCLUDABLE from the
United
States and
I would
risk
criminal
prosecution
and
imprisonment of up to 20 years if I entered the U.S. illegally
after being deported as an aggravated felon*
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I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State
of Utah that the foregoing

is

true and correctRespectfully

Dated: November 1/ 2006*

Submitted/

/ / /}

Juan Carlojl Colin
'
A9^0_Zi-3r^rcr2/Delta 317
Eloy Detention Center
1705 East Hanna Road
Eloy, Arizona 85231
Petitioner/Defendant pro se,
In ICE Custody,
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Odak v. Odak
Utah App.,1998.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT
RULES BEFORE CITING.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Peggy B. ODAK, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Perry D. ODAK, Defendant and Appellant.
No. 981133-CA.
Nov. 13, 1998.
Stephen B. Mitchell and Richard D. Burbidge, Salt
Lake City, for appellant.
Ann L. Wassermann, Salt Lake City, for appellee.
Before DAVIS, BENCH, and GREENWOOD, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
PER CURIAM.
*1 Appellant appeals from a final order of the
district court denying his motion for a contempt
order against appellee. We affirm.
Appellant and appellee were divorced by entry of a
decree of divorce in 1992. The decree ordered "that
the parties not in any way denigrate each other
publicly or privately so as to negatively affect each
other's personal, professional or business relations,
harm each other's professional reputations, or
reduce each other's earning power." Appellant filed
a motion for a contempt order against appellee for
violating this provision, which motion was denied.
On appeal, appellant argues that the district court
erred by implicitly requiring appellant to prove
defamation rather than denigration, and by
proceeding by way of proffer rather than hearing
evidence. When the evidence consists only of
proffers to the district court, the appellate court is in
as good a position to review the proffer as was the

district court, because no assessment of witness
credibility occurred, and affords no deference to the
district court. Hamby v. Jacobson, 769 P.2d 273,
278 (Utah Ct.App.1989). A careful review of the
proffers recorded in the transcript reveals that the
district court did not err in denying appellant's
motion.
Appellant points out that the district court denied
appellant's motion based upon appellant's failure to
prove defamation. The divorce decree prohibits
denigration, not defamation. However, the decree
only prohibits denigrating conduct that negatively
affects the other's personal, professional or business
relations, harms the other's professional reputation,
or reduces the other's earning power. Appellant
failed to proffer any evidence that the statements
made by appellee negatively affected his personal,
professional or business relations, harmed his
professional reputation, or reduced his earning
power.
It is well-settled that an appellate court may affirm a
judgment of a lower court on a ground other than
that relied on by that court. Cox v. Hatch, 161 P.2d
556, 561 (Utah 1988) (citations omitted).
Accordingly, this court affirms the district court's
denial of appellant's motion on the basis that
appellant failed to proffer sufficient evidence to
demonstrate that appellee denigrated appellant to
appellant's harm in violation of the decree.
With respect to appellant's contention that the
district court erroneously relied upon proffers in
making its ruling, it is clear from the record that
appellant failed to object to, and, indeed, consented
to, the court's reliance on proffers. Both parties
expressly submitted the issue for ruling after the
proffers were made. Appellant has therefore waived
this issue. See Montano v. Third Dist Court, Salt
Lake Cty., 934 P.2d 1156, 1157 (Utah Ct.App.1997)
(failure to request evidentiary hearing results in
waiver of issue of whether the procedure employed
violated due process rights).
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We affirm the district court. Appellee's request for
attorney fees on appeal is denied.
UtahApp.,1998.
Odak v. Odak
Not Reported in P.2d, 1998 WL 1758373 (Utah
App.)
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